Post by arfanho7 on Feb 28, 2024 2:32:33 GMT -7
Furthermore user support varies across user types For example internal users public employees are more likely to oppose accounting standards reform relative to external users such as credit analysts and regular citizens. Key concepts include Government lobbying tends to be misaligned with public interest concerns. Internal users such as public employees are more likely to oppose accounting reporting reform than are external users such as credit analysts and regular citizens.
However this difference is moderated in states where public employees benefits are constitutionally guaranteed. This may be the first paper in accounting scholarship to examine the lobbying of governmental entities in the formulation of accounting Indonesia Mobile Number List standards. the lobbying behavior of state governments in the development of recently issued public pension accounting standards GASB and . Consistent with opportunistic motivations we find that states opposition.
To the liability increasing provisions embedded in these standards is increasing in the severity of pension plan underfunding state budget deficits and the use of high discount rates. Further we find opposing states are subject to more stringent balanced budget requirements and greater political pressure from unions. By contrast we find evidence that the support from financial statement users for these provisions is amplified in states with poorly funded plans and large budget deficits suggesting government lobbying is misaligned with a public interest perspective.
However this difference is moderated in states where public employees benefits are constitutionally guaranteed. This may be the first paper in accounting scholarship to examine the lobbying of governmental entities in the formulation of accounting Indonesia Mobile Number List standards. the lobbying behavior of state governments in the development of recently issued public pension accounting standards GASB and . Consistent with opportunistic motivations we find that states opposition.
To the liability increasing provisions embedded in these standards is increasing in the severity of pension plan underfunding state budget deficits and the use of high discount rates. Further we find opposing states are subject to more stringent balanced budget requirements and greater political pressure from unions. By contrast we find evidence that the support from financial statement users for these provisions is amplified in states with poorly funded plans and large budget deficits suggesting government lobbying is misaligned with a public interest perspective.